Volume 120

Issue 2

Article 7

December 2017

What a Contract Has Joined Together Let No Court Cast Asunder:
Abolishing Separability and Codifying the Scope of the Provisions
of Arbitration Agreements
Taylor Payne
McClellan, Powers, Ehmling & Rogers

Richard Bales
Ohio Northern University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Taylor Payne & Richard Bales, What a Contract Has Joined Together Let No Court Cast Asunder:
Abolishing Separability and Codifying the Scope of the Provisions of Arbitration Agreements, 120 W. Va. L.
Rev. (2017).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Payne and Bales: What a Contract Has Joined Together Let No Court Cast Asunder: Ab

WHAT A CONTRACT HAS JOINED TOGETHER LET NO
COURT CAST ASUNDER: ABOLISHING SEPARABILITY AND
CODIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
Taylor Payne & Richard Bales*

I.
II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION
.........................
................ 538
BACKGROUND
.................................
...... 540
A. ContractDefenses at Common Law ...........
...... 540
....... 541
1. Undue Influence and Duress ............
...... 541
..........................
2. Incapacity
..... 542
3. Mistake and Misrepresentation .............
4. Unconscionability
....................................543
...... 545
................
B. The FederalArbitrationAct
.............. 548
C. SCOTUS SeparabilityDecisions............
1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing.. 548
2. Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital v. Mercury
549
.....................................
Construction
........ 552
3. Buckeye Check Cashingv. Cardegna........
......
....... 555
4. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
...... 556
D. Commentary on Separability ................
557
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT................................
...... 558
..................
A. The Severance Approach
1. Gannon v. Circuit City Stores...
................ 558
............... 560
B. The Stand or Fall Together Approach
1. Graham Oil v. ARCO Products ....................... 561
......... 563
C. The Districtof Columbia Circuit Theory .....
563
..................................
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
...... 563
..............................
A. Analysis
1. Analysis of the Severance Approach ..................... 564
2. Analysis of the Stand or Fall Together Approach........... 565
3. Analysis of the District of Columbia Circuit Theory...... 566
...... 567
i. PervasivelyInfected with Illegality ......

*
Taylor Payne is an associate attorney with McClellan, Powers, Ehmling & Rogers in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and received his J.D. from Ohio Northern University, Claude W. Pettit
College of Law. Richard Bales is a Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Claude W. Pettit
College of Law. Both Authors want to acknowledge and thank Professor Stephen J. Ware for
providing inspiration and encouragement and reviewing drafts.

537

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

538

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

B.
V.

[Vol. 120

ii. Effect of Severability Clauses
................. 569
Proposal
.......................................
570

CONCLUSION

............................................

573

ABSTRACT

The doctrine of separability states that a contract containing an
arbitration agreement is "separable" from the arbitration agreement such that the
arbitration agreement is enforceable even if terms of the "container" contract

would otherwise make the entire contract unenforceable. However, the federal
circuits are split on how to apply this doctrine when terms of the arbitration
agreement itself are unenforceable. Circuits that follow the Severance approach
sever unenforceable provisions from arbitration agreements and enforce the
remainder of the arbitration agreement. Circuits that follow the Stand or Fall
Together approach void arbitration agreements with unenforceable provisions
and enforce the container contract without the arbitration agreement.

This Article argues that Congress should abolish the separability
doctrine and amend the Federal Arbitration Act to render specific types of
arbitration agreement provisions as void ab initio. Codifying certain types of
provisions as void ab initio would make those types of provisions unenforceable
as a matter of law. This proposal would reduce litigation over unenforceable
provisions, create easily applicable rules for drafting arbitration agreements,
settle expectations, and allow parties to a contract to utilize all contract defenses.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A construction firm headquartered on the Eastern Seaboard builds
schools all across the country. The standard form contract the firm uses contains
an arbitration agreement which sends all disputes to arbitration in a location of
the firm's choosing. An issue arises over a subcontractor's materials cost, and
the firm attempts to initiate arbitration. The subcontractor sues in federal court,
alleging that the forum-selection provision in the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable under a theory of unconscionability. If the court finds the forumselection provision in the arbitration agreement unconscionable, should the court
strike the forum-selection clause and enforce the rest of the arbitration
agreement? Or should the court rule that the entire arbitration agreement is
tainted by the unconscionable provision and, therefore, is unenforceable? The
resolution of this issue depends on how the court applies separability.
The "separability doctrine" states that arbitration agreements are
separable from their container contracts (called "container contracts" because
they "contain" arbitration agreements) when the container contract has
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provisions that are unenforceable because of public policy,' equitable defenses, 2
or illegality. 3 The separability doctrine is not statutory: it is a judicially created
doctrine. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 4 the
Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements were separable from their
container contracts and could be enforced if the container contract contains
unenforceable provisions.5 If an arbitration agreement is found to be enforceable,
the court must send the dispute to arbitration and let the arbitrator decide all other
contract complaints. 6 Though the Supreme Court required separability to be
applied to arbitration agreements, the Court has never given clear instructions as
to how to apply the doctrine.7 As a result, circuit courts have taken different
approaches.
The Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the Stand or Fall
Together approach.8 These circuits will void an entire arbitration agreement if it
contains unenforceable provisions. Arbitration agreements rendered void are
considered void ab initio, or void from the beginning, meaning that the
arbitration agreement is treated as if it never were part of the container contract. 9
These circuits reason that the terms of an arbitration agreement are integrated,and cannot be individually severed, so even a single unenforceable term will taint
and negate the entire arbitration agreement.' 0
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and the District of Columbia Circuits follow the
severance approach." These circuits will sever, or remove, the unenforceable
terms from an arbitration agreement and enforce the remainder of the arbitration

See, e.g., Mincks Agri Center, Inc. v. Bell Farms, Inc., 611 N.W.2d 270, 281 (Iowa 2000).
2

See, e.g, Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable

defense challenges are typically advanced via a claim of unconscionability. See id.

3

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).

4

388 U.S. 395 (1967).

5
6

Id. at 403-04.
See id.
The Supreme Court uses the term "separability" to refer to this doctrine. Id. at 402. Lower

courts may occasionally call this doctrine "severability." See Snowden v. CheckPoint Check
Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 2002); Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d
469, 479 (9th Cir. 1991). Though lower courts use the term "severability," this Article will refer to
the doctrine as "separability" to follow Supreme Court precedent.

See, e.g., Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 676 (4th Cir. 2016); Perez v. Globe
Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of

Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1999); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43
F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994).
9
10

Ab Initio, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See supra note 8.

"
See, e.g., Booker v. Robert Half Intern., Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 83-86 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hadnot
v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d
646, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 680-83 (8th Cir.
2001).
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agreement. 12 These circuits reason that because the parties entered into an
arbitration agreement, their intent to arbitrate should be preserved.13
This Article will argue that Congress should abolish the separability
doctrine and amend the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to codify specific types
of provisions in arbitration agreements as void ab initio. These codified
provisions would never become terms of arbitration agreements and would be
unenforceable as a matter of law.
Part II will explain the background of separability starting with common
law contract defenses, the early analysis of separability immediately following
the adoption of the FAA, and the cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court which formalized separability. Part III will explain the split between the
Circuits. Section III.A will discuss the Severance approach. Section III.B will
discuss the Stand or Fall Together approach. Section III.C will discuss the
District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that no split exists among the circuits
and how this conclusion is inseparably tied to state law. Part IV will analyze the
split and propose that Congress enact legislation abolishing the separability
doctrine and codifying specific types of provisions as void ab initio when placed
into arbitration agreements.
II. BACKGROUND

First, this section will discuss the common law defenses available in a
contract action. This section will then discuss the history and the origins of the
FAA, focusing on the factors that created the current circuit split as to the
application of the separability doctrine. Next, this Section will detail the
development of arbitration jurisprudence through the primary United States
Supreme Court decisions addressing the subject. Finally, this Section will
provide a commentary discussing the benefits of abolishing the separability
doctrine.
A.

ContractDefenses at Common Law

At common law, a party may avail itself of multiple contract defenses to
avoid enforcement of a contract. Contract defenses include undue influence,
duress, incapacity, mistake, unconscionability, and misrepresentation. 14 These
defenses can be grouped together into different categories. Most contract
defenses allege that no valid contract was formed, whereas unconscionability
alleges that certain provisions are unenforceable.' 5

12

See supra note 11.

I3

Id.

14

See generally WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017)

(providing a broad overview of contract law with chapters specifically addressing defenses).
'
8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
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Undue Influence and Duress

Undue influence and duress can be grouped as defenses that allege that
some pressure was exerted by one party upon the other during contract
formation.1 6 Duress historically involved threats of physical harm or
imprisonment to coerce a party into signing a contract. 17 Courts expanded the
duress theory to include other kinds of threats, such as threats of personal
disgrace or economic loss.' 8 Duress is a subjective determination based on what

a party believed at the time of contracting.1 9
Undue influence is defined as the "unfair persuasion of a party who is
under the domination of the person exercising the persuasion" or one party's
reliance that another party will not act contrary to its best interest.20 In making a
determination, courts look to the mental condition of the parties as well as their
relationship and the sufficiency of consideration between the parties. 2' Undue
influence does not require someone to be persuaded through force, as with
duress, but it requires an imbalance of power or reliance by a vulnerable party
upon the statements of another.22
2. Incapacity
Incapacity is a defense that alleges that a party does not have the legal or
mental capacity to enter into a contract. 23 Incapacity is determined by the law of
the place where a contract is formed.24 Mental incapacity is a question of fact
regarding whether a person has the capacity to enter into a contract and is capable

16

See 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§§

71:4, 71:50 (4th ed.) [hereinafter 28 WILLISTON],

Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
7
Id. § 71:1. A well-known example of duress in popular culture is the procurement of the
release of a music contract with the signature of a bandleader who was threatened with imminent
harm when a mob boss "press[ed] a pistol to the forehead of the band leader and assur[ed] him
with the utmost seriousness that either his signature or his brains would rest on that document in
exactly one minute." MARIO Puzo, THE GODFATHER 37 (1969).
8
See 28 WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 71:2; see, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico 117

F. 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding that threats of great economic loss constituted duress);
Tallmadge v. Robinson, 109 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ohio 1952) (holding the threat of false testimony
of an incestuous affair to be duress).
'9
28 WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 71:2.
20
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
21

28 WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 71:50.

22

See id.

23

22 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 60:44 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017).

24
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 19, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017); see, e.g., Williamson v.
Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Ala. 1980) (holding that contracts of insane persons are
absolutely void); Erkins v. Alaska Tr., LLC, 355 P.3d 516, 519-20 (Alaska 2015) (holding that
incapacity of a party during the formation of a contract renders the contract voidable).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

542

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120

of understanding and deciding upon its terms.25 This may seem similar to a claim
of undue influence, which may examine a party's mental faculties at the time of
contracting and is often brought simultaneously with a claim of incapacity. 26
Incapacity and undue influence differ in that incapacity is a claim that a party
lacked any capacity to enter into a contract, whereas undue influence claims that
a party was coerced, perhaps due to deficiency in mental capacity, into entering
a contract.27

Legal incapacity arises when a certain individual is unable to enter into
a contract as a matter of law. 2 8 Certain classes of individuals may be statutorily
barred from entering into a contract. For instance, many statutes hold contracts
entered into by minors to be void or voidable as a matter of law. 2 9
3.

Mistake and Misrepresentation

Mistake and misrepresentation are defenses that go to the content of a
contract's provisions at the time a contract is formed. A mistake is some
intentional act, unintentional omission, or error arising from ignorance, surprise,
or misplaced confidence regarding fact or law and may be unilateral or mutual.30
A material mistake may render a contract void, whereas an immaterial mistake
will not affect the enforceability of a contract. 31
A misrepresentation is a statement, of fact or law, which is not true. 32
The legal effect of a misrepresentation depends on whether the misrepresentation
is of fact or of opinion and whether the misrepresentation was made

Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Mass. 2012).
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 250, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (discussing mental
weakness in the context of undue influence).
27
Compare 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 628, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (discussing
mental or physical incapacity), with 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 242, Westlaw (database updated Sept.
2017) (discussing the definition, nature, and general considerations of undue influence).
28
5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
29
McCall v. Reed, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1251 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (finding, under Alabama
law, a minor is not responsible for any contract he makes and may disaffirm the same); I.C. ex rel.
Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA, 135 F. Supp. 196, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding, under New York
law, an infant's contract is voidable, and the infant has an absolute right to disaffirm); 5 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
30
DEFENSE AGAINST A PRIMA FACIE CASE § 2:19 (rev. ed.), Westlaw (database updated Mar.
2017).
25

26

31

See id.

32

THOMAS M. GEISLER, JR.,

48 AM.

JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D

329 § 4 (1998), Westlaw

(database updated Sept. 2017).
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intentionally. 33 A material misrepresentation of fact may render a contract void
or voidable, depending on state law. 34
4.

Unconscionability

The defense of unconscionability alleges that the terms of a contract are
oppressive against one party. 35 Unconscionability has two elements. First, there
must be an absence of meaningful choice for one party, called procedural
unconscionability. 36 Second, there must be contract terms that are unreasonably
favorable to the other party, called substantive unconscionability. 37
Most challenges to arbitration agreements are made under the theory of
unconscionability and use the Uniform Commercial Code's definition. Though
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") makes unconscionability applicable
only to sales and leases of goods, courts have expanded the UCC standard to
contracts not involving goods.38 Many cases with holdings outside the articulated
scope of the UCC invoke the concept of unconscionability. 39
As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, if the arbitrationw
clause of a contract itself is enforceable, the validity of other provisions of the
contract must be decided through arbitration.40 Defenses other than
unconscionability look to the formation of the contract as a whole. A claim of
duress in the formation of an arbitration agreement would be a defense to the
enforcement of the entire contract. 4 1Likewise, a defense of incapacity would be
raised against the entire contract because a claim of incapacity alleges that one
party was unable to enter the contract.42 Mistake and misrepresentation are more
specific than incapacity or duress but are still formation defenses.4 3 A defense of

3

Id.

34

Id.§ 11.

3

8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017).

36

Id.

37

Id.
Id. § 18:5.
Id. (citing Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967); Williams v.

3
3

Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Phx. Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad.,

Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Nev. 1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996); Greene v. Gibraltar
Mortg. Inv. Corp., 488 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1980)).
4
THOMAS B. BERRriT, 35 MAss. PRAC., CONSUMER LAW § 5:43 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Oct. 2017).
41
17B C.J.S. Contracts § 985, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017).
42

See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 173, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017).

43

See DEFENSE AGAINST A PRIMA FACIE CASE, supra note 30.
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mistake would claim that a party did not agree to the text of the contract." A
claim of misrepresentation would claim that a party was not completely truthful
in the way it presented certain provisions of the contract, and, therefore, the
contract is unenforceable. 4 5 Unconscionability is the defense most widely used
when attacking arbitration agreements because it attacks the oppressive nature of
the arbitration agreement itself and not its formation. Unconscionability is a
defense that alleges that a party agreed to a provision but for some reason that
provision is unenforceable.4 6 Though often utilized, unconscionability is poorly
defined, and its application can be difficult.
For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that substantive
unconscionability alone is grounds for finding an agreement or provision
unenforceable. 47 California courts use a sliding scale where substantive and
procedural unconscionability are balanced but are not required to be equal.48
Montana applies an adhesion theory of unconscionability to standard form
contracts. 4 9 Adhesion contracts are contracts formed with an imbalance in
bargaining power between the parties.50 Montana will determine that a contract
is a contract of adhesion if one of the parties has "no voice" in the bargaining
process and will not enforce that contract.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has noted that "[u]nconscionability is
an amorphous concept that evades precise definition[]" and is impossible to
define.52 "It is not a concept but a determination to be made in light of a variety
of factors not unifiable into a formula." 53 As will be discussed later, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the FAA applies uniformly to all arbitration
provisions in all courts, but due to the differences in state law, it cannot be
applied uniformly.54 The next Section will examine the text and purpose of the
FAA.

4
See Monet v. PERA, 877 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tex. App. 1994) (finding mutual mistake
when the parties agreed that asbestos had been removed from a building but a contractor had not
removed the asbestos).
45
See GEISLER, supra note 32.
46
8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:19 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated May 2017).

Schnuerle v. Insight Comm'n Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 576 n.12 (Ky. 2012).
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
49
Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull's-Eye, or Moving Target: The FAA, Compulsory
Arbitration, & Common-Law Contract,31 VT. L. REV. 141, 182-83 (2006).
5o
See id. at 146-47.
51
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2002).
52
Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
47
48

53

Id.

54

See infra Section II.C.
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The FederalArbitrationAct

The FAA was enacted in 1925." Section two of the FAA reads in part:
"A written provision . .. to settle by arbitration . .. shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.56
Section four of the FAA requires a court to determine whether there are
any issues with the making of the arbitration agreement, and if there are no
Arbitration agreements are
issues, the court must compel arbitration.
enforceable unless a contract defense to enforcement is successfully raised and
the arbitration agreement is found unenforceable. 58 A court will hear complaints
against the enforcement of an arbitration agreement before the dispute goes to
arbitration, but a court will not rule on the container contract.59 The FAA allows
a court to address the arbitration agreement separately from the container
contract but provides no direction for how to separate an unenforceable
arbitration agreement. 60 This lack of clarity has contributed to the separability
split between the circuits. 61 The uncertainty that permeates arbitration law did
not originate with the FAA. Arbitration law has been inconsistent since the
founding of the United States.
Following the American Revolution, arbitration was called a wide
variety of names, including arbitration, common law arbitration, arbitration in
pais, reference, appraisal, and others, borrowing from the English arbitration
tradition. 62 Historically, arbitration procedure in the United States has been
consistent in its inconsistency with different states adopting different approaches
to arbitration. 63 Arbitration was applied to disputes involving real property in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, disputes within the Quaker communities of New
Jersey,64 and disputes of mercantile and maritime nature in Massachusetts.65
Kentucky and New Jersey passed arbitration statutes codifying specific rules

5
56
5

9 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
Id. §2.
Id. §4.

Id. § 2.
Id. §4.
60
See id.
61
See infra Part Ill.
62
Carli N. Conklin, A Variety of State-Level Procedures, Practices, and Policies:Arbitration
in Early America, 2016 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 65 (2016).
63
Id. at 65-66.
6
Id. at 70.
58

s9

65

Id. at 73-74.
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governing arbitration, whereas other states relied on common law arbitration, a
process with few formal requirements. 6 6
Arbitration agreements were not treated as separate from container
contracts before the introduction of the separability doctrine; instead, common
law severability applied.67 Under common law severability, if a court found that
one unenforceable provision of an agreement tainted an entire contract, the entire
contract could be invalidated, or, if possible, a court could sever the offending
portion of the agreement and enforce the remainder of the agreement. 6 8
Severability was discretionary.
Arbitration agreements did not have an identity separate from their
container contracts. For example, in Polk v. Cleveland Railway Co.,69 Polk
sought to enforce an arbitration agreement separately from an unenforceable
container contract. 7 0 The Court held that because the container contract was
unenforceable, the arbitration agreement, which was integrated into the container
contract, was unenforceable as well.7 In the early 20th century, arbitration was
still consistent in its inconsistency, and Congress attempted to unify arbitration
procedure.
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA as part of a larger movement of
procedural reform arising from frustration with the "complex, overburdened
court system of the time" and the disparate applications of arbitration among the
states. 7 2 With no federal arbitration statute, federal courts applied state law to
arbitration questions.73 The FAA sought to unify the way that arbitration was
conducted.74 Following the passage of the FAA, arbitration became more
commonplace, but even as federal arbitration procedure began to solidify, state
courts continued to apply divergent theories when interpreting arbitration
agreements.
Before the separability doctrine was definitively applied to arbitration
agreements, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision allowing

66

Id. at 61, 68, 70.

67
See Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REv. 711, 741 n.178 (2015) (citing 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 318

(2004)).
68

Id.

69

70

151 N.E. 808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925).
Id. at 809-10.

7'

Id. at 810.

72

Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the FederalArbitration Act Through the Lens of
History,

2016 J. DIsp. RESOL. 115, 130 (2016) (stating that, as with arbitration, before the 1938 passage of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts often followed state court procedure pursuant
to the Conformity Act of 1872, an act which had sought to create a uniform procedure in state

courts).
73

Id.

74

See id. at 135.
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'

the reformation of an arbitration agreement in Paramount Famous Lasky v.
United States.75 As Hollywood emerged as the powerhouse of motion picture
production, studios often negotiated form contracts with film exhibitors that
included arbitration provisions.76 In 1929, a movie theater sued Paramount on
the grounds that the studio's standard form arbitration agreement was
unconscionable. 77 The arbitration agreement required all claims to be arbitrated
by an arbitration board of film industry insiders chosen by Paramount.78
On appeal from the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
the United States Supreme Court held that though arbitration was well-adapted
to the needs of the motion picture industry, arbitration was impermissible "when
under the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements which
unreasonably" favored one party.79 The Court struck the unconscionable
provisions and required the parties to reform the arbitration agreement by
agreeing to new enforceable terms.80 Although this ruling was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Paramount,the Supreme Court did not hold that
reformation was required.8
Following Paramount, state courts applied three different approaches in,
separating arbitration agreements while citing to Paramount. The Utah Supreme
Court held that unenforceable arbitration agreements were separable from
container contracts, and the container contract could be enforced without the
arbitration agreement. 82 Louisiana courts held that arbitration agreements merely
evinced that arbitration was the agreed-to means of dispute resolution, so an
unenforceable arbitration agreement could be severed without destroying the
entire agreement. 83 The Idaho Supreme Court held that an entire contract would
be void if an arbitration agreement contained an unenforceable provision. 84
Following years of uncertainty, the United States Supreme Court formally
applied the doctrine of separability to arbitration agreements. The rules created
by the Supreme Court will be addressed in the next section.

Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930).
See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. Nat'l Theatre Corp., 49 F.2d 64, 65 (4th Cir. 193 1);
United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
77
See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 F.2d. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
78
Id. at 38-41.
79 Id. at 43.
80
United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
81
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930).
82
Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 17 P.2d 294, 297 (Utah 1932).
83
Fox Film Corp. v. Buchanan,136 So. 197, 198 (La. Ct. App. 1931).
84
Fox Film Corp. v. Tri-State Theatres, 6 P.2d 135, 140 (Idaho 1931).
7

76
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SCOTUS Separability Decisions

The United States Supreme Court first applied the separability doctrine
to arbitration in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing.85 In Prima
Paint, the Supreme Court held that a court, not an arbitrator, must decide the
validity of the arbitration agreement. 86 Since that case, the Supreme Court has
held that an arbitration agreement is enforceable even if all parties in a dispute
did not enter an arbitration agreement. 87 Further, the Supreme Court has held that
state courts must apply the separability doctrine to disputes in state court,8 8 and
states may not enact statutes rendering certain kinds of complaints as
unarbitratable.8 9 The following section will discuss these Supreme Court
decisions, beginning with Prima Paintv. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing.90
1.

PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing

The United States Supreme Court definitively held that separability
applied to arbitration agreements in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing.9 ' On October 7, 1964, Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Company ("F & C") entered into a "Consulting Agreement" with Prima Paint
Corporation. 9 2 Less than three weeks later, both parties entered into a contract in
which Prima Paint purchased F & C's paint business. 9 3 The purchase contract
included an arbitration agreement which would send "any controversy or claim
arising out of' it to arbitration conducted by the City of New York. 94
Prima Paint determined that F & C had fraudulently represented that it
was solvent and able to perform its contractual obligations when it was in fact
insolvent and intended to file Chapter XI bankruptcy shortly after execution of
the consulting agreement. 95 Prima Paint sued in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, seeking rescission of the consulting agreement
on the basis of the alleged fraudulent inducement, but F & C cross-moved to stay

8

86
87
88
89
90

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
Id.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983).
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 449 (2011).
388 U.S. 395 (1967).

92

Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.

93

Id. at 397.

94

Id. at 398.

95

Id.

91
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the court proceedings pending arbitration. 9 6 The District Court97 granted F & C's
motion to stay the action pending arbitration, holding that a charge of fraud in
the inducement of a container contract containing an arbitration clause was a
question for the arbitrators and not for the court. 9 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit dismissed Prima Paint's appeal, holding that a claim of fraud in
the inducement of a contract generally and not an arbitration clause itself is for
the arbitrators and not for the courts. 99
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that an arbitrator was
to resolve a claim of fraud in the inducement of the container contract, whereas
a court will resolve a claim of fraud in the inducement of an arbitration
agreement.'"t The Court noted a split between the circuits. The Second Circuit
held that arbitration clauses are severable from the contracts in which they are
embedded under the FAA while the First Circuit looked to the law of the state
where the contract was formed to determine whether the provision was
severable.' 0 1 The Court held that because of the powers granted to the federal
courts by Congress in the FAA, a federal court could determine the separability
of an arbitration provision "based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty,"' but only
to the complaining party's formation defenses as to the arbitration agreement. 102
This approach was derived from 9 U.S.C. § 2, which states that arbitration
provisions "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," holding arbitration
provisions to be separate and distinct from the rest of the contract.' 0 3 Were that
section to state the opposite, that arbitration clauses were unenforceable, it would
be clear that arbitration provisions were separate from the remainder of the
contract, so deriving separability from 9 U.S.C. § 2 is no stretch of the statute.
2. Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital v. Mercury Construction'04
In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements
would be upheld even if arbitration created duplicative litigation and failed to

t00

Id. at 398-99.
Prima Paint Corp. v.
Prima Paint Corp. v.
Prima Paint Corp. v.
Prima Paint Corp. v.

1o'

Id. at 402-03.

102

Id. at 405-06.

96
9
9
9

Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood

& Conklin
& Conklin
& Conklin
& Conklin

Mfg.
Mfg.
Mfg.
Mfg.

Co.,
Co.,
Co.,
Co.,

262 F. Supp. 605, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
388 U.S. 395, 399 (1967).
360 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1966).
388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967).

103
Andre V. Egle, Note & Comment, Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.:
To Challenge an ArbitrationAgreement You Must Challenge the ArbitrationAgreement, 78 WASH.
L. REv. 199, 207-08 (2003).
104

460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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resolve an entire dispute.' 0 5 In that case, a North Carolina hospital contracted
with Mercury Construction, an Alabama construction contractor, to construct
additions to the hospital beginning in 1975 and ending in 1979.106 The contract
included provisions for resolving disputes by submitting the dispute to the
supervising architectural firm whose decision could then be submitted by either
party to arbitration per an arbitration agreement. 0 7
In 1977, Mercury, the Hospital, and the Architect held a meeting, and
Mercury agreed, at the Architect's request, to withhold its claims for extended
overhead and increase in construction costs due to delay or inaction by the
Hospital until the work was substantially completed.' 0 8 In 1980, Mercury
discussed its claims with the Architect, and after a period of negotiations, the
Hospital decided that it would pay none of Mercury's claims.'

09

10 "[T]he
The Hospital sued in state court for declaratory judgment.o
Hospital sought a declaration that there was no right to arbitration; a stay of
arbitration; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to Mercury; and a
declaration that if the Hospital should be found liable in any respect to Mercury,
it would be entitled to indemnity from the Architect.""' Mercury sent a demand
for arbitration, and the Hospital obtained an injunction from the state court
staying arbitration.1 12 Mercury objected to the stay, and, after it was lifted twelve
days later, sued in federal court to compel arbitration. 113
The district court stayed the federal proceeding until the state court
action was resolved, but Mercury appealed the stay and sought mandamus to
compel arbitration."l 4 On appeal, the circuit court decided en banc to remand and
compel arbitration.''1 The circuit court decided that the underlying contractual
dispute was arbitrable under the FAA and that the arbitration agreement was
enforceable." 6 The Hospital sought a rehearing, which was denied, but the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.117

106

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 4-5.

107

Id. at 5.

08

Id. at 6.

109

Id.
Id. at 7.

1os

10

"
112

Id.
Id.

11

Id.

114

Id. at 7-8.

1'

Id. at 8.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 4.

116
117
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The Supreme Court noted that the FAA calls for summary and speedy
disposition of motions or petitions to enforce arbitration clauses." s When
reaching its holding, the circuit court had "full briefs and evidentiary submissions
from both parties on the merits of the arbitrability" of their dispute.1 9 The Circuit
Court held that there were no disputed issues of fact requiring determination
under 9 U.S.C. § 4.120 That section requires courts to determine whether any
issues bearing on the enforcement of the arbitration agreement are present.1 2 1
The Circuit Court's determination that the arbitration agreement was enforceable
was upheld.1 22
Also, the Hospital had asserted that arbitration was not possible because
there were two substantive disputes: "one with Mercury, concerning Mercury's
claim for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect, concerning
the Hospital's claim for indemnity for any liability it may have to Mercury." 2 3
The dispute with the Architect could not be sent to arbitration because there was
no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Architect.1 24 If arbitration
were compelled between Mercury and the Hospital, the Hospital would be forced
to resolve its claim with the Architect in a different forum.' 25 Though
unfortunate, this "piecemeal" resolution was required because the FAA required
courts to give effect to arbitration agreements.1 26 The Supreme Court noted that
arbitration agreements must be enforced "notwithstanding the presence of other
persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration
agreement." 2 7 The Hospital would have to litigate the arbitrability of the
Mercury dispute in federal court rather than state court because Mercury brought
its claim there. 128 Because the Architect was not a party to the arbitration
agreement, that dispute must be resolved in court and not before the arbitrator of
the Mercury dispute.1 2 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
determination.
In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court reiterated the primacy of
arbitration agreements in contracts. Arbitration agreements would be given effect
even if they created duplicative hearings. Though Moses H Cone restated

"1

124

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.

125

Id.

126
127

Id.
Id.

128

Id. at 20-21.

129

See id.

119
120

121
122

123
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previous Supreme Court rulings holding that arbitration agreements were
enforceable barring a contract defense or other issue of enforceability, state
courts did not hold arbitration in such esteem. Regardless of federal policy
favoring arbitration, the Court stated in a footnote that "enforcement of the
[FAA] is left in large part to the state courts." 1 30 State courts formulated a variety
of rules regarding arbitration agreements and separability, and this variation was
addressed in part in Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna.131
3.

Buckeye Check Cashingv. Cardegna

In Buckeye, the Supreme Court held that Prima Paint applied to state
courts as well as federal courts.1 32 John Cardegna and Donna Reuter entered into
various deferred-payment transactions with Buckeye Check Cashing, which
gave cash for personal checks in the amount of the check minus a finance
charge. 133 For each separate transaction, they signed a "Deferred Deposit and
Disclosure Agreement" which required disputes to be resolved in arbitration. 134
Cardenga and Reuter brought suit in Florida state court, alleging that Buckeye
charged usurious interest rates and that the agreement violated various Florida
laws making the deferred-payment contract and the arbitration agreement within
it prima facie illegal.135 The trial court denied Buckeye's motion to compel
arbitration, holding that a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a claim
that a contract is illegal and void. 136 The appellate court reversed, but the trial
court's verdict was reinstated by the Florida Supreme Court on the theory that
enforcing an arbitration agreement in a contract challenged as unlawful would
violate state policy and contract law. 137
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that first, as a matter
of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration agreement is severable from
the remainder of the contract.' 38 Second, the Court held that "unless the challenge
is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered
by the arbitrator in the first instance." 39 Third, the Court held that separability

133

Szalai, supra note 72, at 118 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32).
546 U.S. 440 (2006).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 442.

134

Id. at 442-43.

135

Id. at 443.

136

Id.
Id.

130
131

132

137

Id. at 445 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04
(1967)).
139
Id. at 445-46 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40304 (1967)).
138
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applies to state as well as federal courts. 14 0 The Court determined that because
Cardegna's claim attacked the agreement as a whole, the complaint must be
considered by an arbitrator, not a court. 14 1 The Court reversed the Florida
Supreme Court because the conclusion that the separability doctrine did not
apply in state court ran contrary to Prima Paint.142
Buckeye applied separability to all state courts and federal courts, where
it had been applied following Prima Paint.143 Buckeye did not explain how to
apply separability, whether a court could void an arbitration agreement under
certain circumstances, or whether only specific provisions must be severed.
Separability became universally applicable to all courts, but because Buckeye
merely restated the rule in Prima Paint, no rule for applying separability to the
agreements themselves was provided."
In footnote one of Buckeye, the Supreme Court noted that the question
of the contract's validity is different from the question of whether any agreement
was ever created.1 45 Buckeye allows courts to address entire container contracts
when the issue is whether the signatures on the contract were valid, whether the
signor lacked authority to sign the contract, or whether the signor lacked the
mental capacity to assent. 146 The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit,
suggested that this footnote, "as well as other federal and state jurisprudence,
indicates that in [the latter situations above], there would be no agreement at all
between the parties, including an agreement to arbitrate," and the dispute would
not be sent to arbitration by a court regardless of the presence of an arbitration
agreement.1

47

Buckeye does not require state courts to send every claim brought against
a container contract to arbitration. Buckeye only requires a court to send a
complaint directly to arbitration when a claim is made that the container contract
is unconscionable. Claims that a contract is void will be heard by a court. Even
though the parties have entered an arbitration agreement, a court will always hear

'

Id. at 446.

141

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445-46.

142

143

'
Courts still hold arbitration agreements as void while not merely separating the
unenforceable provisions. See, e.g., Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 673-74 (4th Cir.
2016) (invalidating an arbitration agreement that renounced the application of federal law to any

claims); Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2010) (invalidating arbitration
agreement that was so one-sided that the enforcing party was seeking an advantage and not a

legitimate mechanism for dispute resolution); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547, 558
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (invalidating provision that could not be severed without undermining arbitration

itself).
145

Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1.

146

Id.

147

Fluid Disposal Specialties, Inc. v. UniFirst Corp., 186 So. 3d 210, 217 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
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complaints of whether a valid contract was formed to determine whether a
contract actually exists. The Supreme Court has not revisited this footnote to
clarify. Besides the issue of when separability is applicable, another issue yet to
be ruled on by the Supreme Court is to what extent a court may examine the
container contract in determining the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.
After Buckeye, in Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker,148 the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a court may examine an entire contamier contract in
order to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement. 149 In Ozarks, the
Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the "NO WAIVER" and "OUR
WAIVER OF RIGHTS" clauses in the container contract destroyed the parties'
mutual assent to the arbitration agreement.' 50 The court explained that while
Buckeye held that it was improper for a court to consider claims regarding a
container contract as a whole, "a court is [neither] constrained to the clause itself
[nor] prohibited from considering other parts of the contract relating to the
agreement to arbitrate disputes arising from the contract," a position long held
by the Arkansas Supreme Court and also addressed by the Fourth Circuit.' 5 1
The United States Supreme Court has offered no guidance on whether
or not a court may examine a container contract when ruling on an arbitration
agreement. When most courts apply separability, courts only examine the
arbitration agreement to determine its validity. Cases like Bank of the Ozarks
seem to circumvent the separability doctrine.152
When a party resisting arbitration attacks the arbitration agreement, a
court can examine the container contract, find unconscionable provisions, and
effectively use the container contract's unenforceability to find the arbitration
agreement unenforceable. Once the arbitration agreement is separated, the entire
contract would then be placed under a judicial lens. 153 Following this approach
allows a court to determine the container contract's enforceability under the guise
of examining the arbitration agreement. Buckeye sought to expand separability
into state courts, but state courts have found ways to circumvent separability.
Though Buckeye has been resisted in some respects, the Supreme Court further
expanded separability into state courts by striking down state laws barring certain
types of arbitration agreements.

148

487 S.W.3d 808 (Ark. 2016).

Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 434 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ark. 2014).
Id. at 813.
'1
Id. (citing Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc. v. McGinnis, 289 S.W.3d 37, 45 (2008));
see also Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 676 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that although
the court's focus must be on the arbitration agreement and not the container agreement, "it is only
natural for us to interpret the arbitration agreement in light of the broader contract in which it is
situated").
152
The United States Supreme Court denied to hear this case. Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v.
Walker, 137 S. Ct. 126 (2016) (mem.).
I53
Id.
149

50
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AT& T Mobility v. Concepcion 154

In Concepcion, the Supreme Court ruled that state laws which held
certain types of arbitration provisions unconscionable were invalid.' 55 The Court
held that arbitration agreements must be treated the same as any other contract.
The Concepcions entered into a new cell phone contract that included free
phones, but they were charged sales tax on the retail value of the free phones.
The contract between the Concepcions and AT&T required all disputes to be
arbitrated but did not permit class-wide arbitration.1 5 6 When the Concepcions
sued AT&T in federal court, their suit was consolidated with a class action
alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales
tax on free phones.' 5 7 The district court denied AT&T's motion to compel
arbitration under the Concepcions' contract because California's Discover Bank
rule voided arbitration provisions that disallowed class-wide arbitration.' The
Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the FAA, which makes arbitration agreements
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract" did not preempt its ruling.' 59
On petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that
"[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim,
the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." 6 o
6
which barred class action
The Court held that California's Discover Bank rule, 1'
62
waivers, was preempted by the FAA.1 The Court went further, suggesting that
"[t]he same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable
arbitration agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that
disallow an ultimate disposition by a jury[.]" 63 Through Concepcion, the Court
abrogated all state laws which rendered specific types of arbitration provisions
invalid. ' State laws may not treat arbitration agreements differently than other
types of contracts.' 6 5
Though the Court struck down state laws which barred certain types of
arbitration provisions, unconscionability as a contract defense to arbitration

154

563 U.S. 333 (2011).

'5
156

Id. at 352.
Id. at 336.

1s7

Id. at 337.

iss

Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 333 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
Id. at 341 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008))
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1117 (Cal. 2005).

159
160
161

162

Concepcion, 363 U.S. at 352.

163

Id. at 342.

16

See id. at 351-52.

I65

Id.
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agreements still exists and can render arbitration clauses invalid on a case-bycase basis.1 6 6 To raise unconscionability, a plaintiff must challenge the
arbitration agreement-and only the arbitration agreement-in court and raise
the defense under general state contract law. Concepcion only struck down state
laws which treated arbitration agreements differently than other contracts. 67
Though there is disagreement among commentators, Concepcion did not
eliminate the unconscionability defense as to arbitration agreements because
unconscionability is still allowed as a defense within Section 2 of the FAA,
which allows any defense in contract law or equity to be raised against an
arbitration agreement.' 6 8 Further, federal arbitration law leaves the definition of
unconscionability in the hands of the states.' 69
The only effect Concepcion had on plaintiffs was to limit their ability
"to take the easy way out" 70 by claiming that certain provisions were invalid
under state law instead of having to prove unconscionability under general
contract law. To raise unconscionability after Concepcion, a plaintiff must prove
the elements of unconscionability under the laws of the jurisdiction where the
action is brought. '' The legal community has written extensively about the
doctrine of separability, and the next Section will examine some of the
commentary on the doctrine.
D. Commentary on Separability
Though the Supreme Court heavily favors separability, the doctrine of
separability is not without its detractors.1 7 2 Professor Stephen Ware argues for
166

Id.

Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330,
339 & n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that Concepcion preserved general state contract law
and abrogated laws which applied only to arbitration).
68
Jonathon L. Serafini, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving UnconscionabilityAfter AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONz. L. REv. 187, 213 (2013).
69
Id. at 211.
170
Megan Barnett, Comment, There Is Still Hopefor the Little Guy: UnconscionabilityIs Still
a Defense Against Arbitration Clauses Despite AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 33 WHiTTIER L.
REV. 651, 652 (2012).
171
Id. at 665.
172
See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, "Nothing Comes of Nothing". . . or Does It??? A Critical
167

Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.

223, 231 (2001); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justicefor Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L.
REv. 819, 825 (2003); John Douglas Stiner, Arbitration: Shaffer v. Jeffery: The Oklahoma
Supreme Court Rejects the Separability Doctrine and Takes a Step Back in the Enforcement of
Arbitration Clauses Under Oklahoma Law, 50 OKLA. L. REv. 243, 245-46 (1997); Zeb-Michael
Curtin, Note, Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Today's Changed Arbitration Regime: The
Casefor InseparabilityandJudicialDecisionmakingin the Context of Mental IncapacityDefenses,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1907 (2005).
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the abolition of the separability doctrine in favor of applying general contract
law. Prior to contracting, parties have a right to access the courts to resolve a
dispute.1 7 3 The right to litigate is alienable through normal contract channels,
such as creating an arbitration agreement. 174 "The separability doctrine makes
the right to litigate alienable under a lower standard of consent than is found in
contract law ... by removing from the right to litigate the protection provided by
contract law's defenses to enforcement."' 7 1 Under severability, entering into an
arbitration agreement removes the protections of the courts, especially the
protections provided by contract defenses. Courts, being unable to adjudge
anything beyond the arbitration agreement, cannot defend the enforcement of
otherwise unenforceable provisions beyond the arbitration agreement.
Professor Ware would like to see separability abolished in favor of
applying general contract law to all contracts and contract provisions, including
arbitration agreements.' 76 By abolishing separability, an entire contract could be
adjudged by a court, taking into account all contract defenses and claims before
heading to arbitration and ensuring that a complaining party has all contract
defenses available to them.
Abolishing separability would work to mend the circuit split between the
Stand or Fall Together and Severance circuits by making the split unnecessary.
The next Section will analyze the circuit split. Section A will explain the
Severance approach. Section B will explain the Stand or Fall Together approach.
Section C will discuss the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion that no split
exists.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Part will first introduce the Severance approach as applied by the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts. Then, it will present
the Stand and Fall Together approach applied by the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts. The final Section will discuss the District of Columbia
Circuit's theory that the differing approaches are not a circuit split but are simply
the product of interpreting differing types of arbitration agreements.

173
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law's Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEv. L.J. 107, 119-20 (2007).
174

Id. at 120.

175

Id. at 120-21.

176

Id.
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The Severance Approach

The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits177 follow the
Severance approach. In these circuits, unenforceable provisions of an arbitration
agreement are separated from the remainder of the agreement, and the remainder
of the arbitration agreement is enforced with the container contract. 7 8 Disputes
in these circuits will be arbitrated, regardless of the objections of the party
resisting arbitration,' 7 9 unless the entire arbitration agreement is found to be
unenforceable. This approach is best illustrated by the Eighth Circuit in Circuit
City Stores v. Gannon.'80
1.

Gannon v. Circuit City Stores

In May 1998, Marken Gannon applied for employment with a Circuit
City store in Missouri.' 8 ' As a part of her employment paperwork, Circuit City
presented Gannon with its Dispute Resolution Agreement requiring that Gannon
agree to settle all employment-related claims exclusively through arbitration.1 82
She was advised through a clause in the agreement to familiarize herself with the
rules and procedures of settling a dispute by arbitration prior to signing.' 83 The
agreement contained bold type terms informing Gannon the agreement affected
her legal rights and suggested she seek legal advice before signing.' 84 "It also
stated that she could withdraw her consent up to three days after signing the
agreement and specified how she could effectuate a withdrawal."'8 Gannon
signed the agreement, and she was hired.1 8 6
One year later, Circuit City terminated Gannon.' 8 7 Following her
termination, she filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity

1n
See Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (8th
Cir. 2001).
178
Adam Borstein, Note, Arbitrary Enforcement: When Arbitration Agreements Contain
Unlawful Provisions, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1259, 1259 (2006); Michael K. Darning, To Sever or
to Destroy?: The Eighth Circuit Allows Invalid Provisions to Be Severed from Otherwise
Enforceable Arbitration Agreements, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 425, 425 (2002); Stephen K. Huber,
The Arbitration Jurisprudenceofthe Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 497, 498 (2004).
179
Borstein, supra note 178, at 1259.

80

262 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2001).

181

Id. at 679.

182

Id.

83

Id.

I84

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id.
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Commission and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, alleging that
during her employment with Circuit City, she had encountered sexual
harassment, a hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation.' 8 8
She then brought suit in federal court. "Circuit City responded by filing a motion
to dismiss the case and to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement
Gannon had signed."1 89 The district court declined to compel arbitration because
the clause limiting punitive damages rendered the entire arbitration agreement
unenforceable.1 " Circuit City filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds
that it no longer enforced the punitive damages clause in its arbitration
agreements and that the severability clause served to automatically strike terms
judicially determined to be unenforceable. 191 The district court denied the
motion, and Circuit City appealed.1 92 Circuit City did not challenge the ruling
that the punitive damages clause was unenforceable.1 9 3 Rather, Circuit City
argued that the illegal clause should be severed and Gannon should be compelled
to arbitrate her claims under the remaining terms of the agreement. 94
Gannon argued that because the arbitration provision was invalid, the
Circuit City argued that ther
entire agreement should be found invalid;'
arbitration provision was severable from the rest of the agreement.' 96 The court
noted that its role was to determine only "whether the parties have entered a valid
agreement to arbitrate and, if so, whether the existing dispute falls under the
coverage of the agreement." 1 97 If the court were to conclude that the parties had
reached a valid agreement, then Section 2 of the FAA would compel judicial
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The illegal provision of the arbitration
agreement did not constitute an essential part of the arbitration agreement, and
in looking to Missouri law and the general contract principle of severability, the
court held that "[t]he essence of the contract between Circuit City and Gannon is
an agreement to settle their employment disputes through binding arbitration,"
and "[t]he punitive-damages clause represents only one aspect of their agreement
and can be severed without disturbing the primary intent of the parties to arbitrate
98
their disputes."'

188
189

Id.
Id.

190

Id.

191
192

Id.
Id.

193

Id.

194

195

Id.
Id. at 68 1.

196

Id. at 679.

Id. at 680 (citing Larry's United Super, Inc., v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir.
2001)).
197

198

Id. at 681.
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The court stated that the agreement itself was not undermined by the
invalidity of a small portion of the arbitration agreement.1 99 The court cited to
Hooters of America v. Phillips,20 0 where the Fourth Circuit had held an entire
arbitration agreement unenforceable because Hooters promulgated "so many
biased rules" that it created "a sham system unworthy even of the name of
arbitration." 20 1 Specifically, Hooters conditioned eligibility for raises, transfers,
and promotions upon an employee signing an "Agreement to arbitrate
employment-related disputes . .. including any claim of discrimination, sexual
harassment, retaliation, or wrongful discharge, whether arising under federal or
state law." 202 Hooters also implemented a mechanism by which it would select
its own three-person board of arbitrators, ensuring a biased result. 2 0 3 The entire
Hooters arbitration agreement was found to be unenforceable due to the sheer
number of unenforceable provisions as well as the compulsory nature of the
arbitration agreement. Once the illegal provisions were redlined, nothing
remained of the arbitration agreement.
The arbitration agreement in Hooters was permeated with far more
illegal terms than the Circuit City agreement. Hooters was not comparable to
Circuit City. The Eighth Circuit found in favor of Circuit City and severed the
unenforceable provision of the arbitration agreement. Severing the punitive
damages clause, in the opinion of the court, did not work against the intent of the
parties and did not substantially alter the agreement. 204 The next Section will
demonstrate how circuits that follow the Stand or Fall Together approach apply
separability.
B.

The Stand or Fall TogetherApproach

The Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that arbitration
agreements containing unenforceable provisions are entirely void. 2 0 5 Either the
entire arbitration agreement is enforced or the entire arbitration agreement is
rendered void. This approach is analogous to the common law contract doctrine
of voidance which allowed courts to void contracts which contained
unenforceable provisions. Parties who resist arbitration in these circuits will
litigate if unenforceable provisions are found in the arbitration agreement. Per 9
U.S.C. § 4, a court "shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not

199

Id.

200

173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. (quoting Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Hooters, 173 F.3d at 936.

201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 938.
Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681.
See cases cited supra note 8.
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in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration."
In these circuits, including an unenforceable provision in an arbitration
agreement is an "issue" under 9 U.S.C. § 4 which sends the dispute to litigation.
These circuits seek to deter the insertion of any illegal provisions into arbitration
agreements.20 6 This approach ensures that a complaining party is protected and
can raise all relevant contract defenses, but the parties may be forced into
unbargained for litigation. The Ninth Circuit case of Graham Oil Company v.
ARCO Products Company 207 illustrates the Stand or Fall Together approach to
arbitration agreements.
1.

Graham Oil v. ARCO Products

In Graham Oil, Graham Oil and ARCO entered into a Branded
Distributor Gasoline Agreement effective from January 1, 1991, to December
31, 1993; this agreement included an arbitration agreement.20 8 The parties agreed
that Graham Oil would purchase a minimum amount of gasoline each month
during the period of the Agreement.209 Eleven months into the agreement period,
"ARCO notified Graham Oil that it intended to terminate the Agreement"
because "Graham Oil had not been purchasing the required minimum amount of
gasoline as specified in the Agreement." 21 0 Graham Oil filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction that
prohibited ARCO from terminating the Agreement for 90 days. 2 11 Instead of
reaching the merits of Graham Oil's claims, the court found that arbitration, per
the agreement, was Graham Oil's exclusive remedy.212 The district court
required the parties to complete the arbitration within 90 days.2 13 Graham Oil
appealed and refused to submit to arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause
2 14
in the agreement was invalid and that a court had to hear its case.
The arbitration provision required Graham Oil to surrender various
rights under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"). 215 The
arbitration agreement forfeited Graham Oil's statutorily-mandated rights to
recover exemplary damages from ARCO, to recover reasonable attorney's fees

206
207

208

See Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994).
43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1246.

209

Id.

210

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

211
212
213
214
215
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from ARCO if Graham Oil prevailed on certain claims, and to a one-year statute
of limitations on its claims against ARCO.2 16 Finding that the arbitration
provisions circumvented the protectionist purpose of the PMPA, the circuit court
moved on to the issue of separability. 217
The circuit court noted that arbitration agreements must be treated as
separable from their container contracts unless the parties clearly intend the
agreement not be separable. 2 1 8 No evidence was presented that the parties did not
wish the agreement to be separable or that parties had not intended to enter into
arbitration. 2 1 9 Because of policy favoring the separability of arbitration
agreements, the circuit court found the arbitration agreement to be separable.220
The only open question was to what extent the clause was separable.
The court examined the history of contract integration. Integration is a
"well-known principle in contract law [which holds] that a clause cannot be
severed from a contract when it is an integrated part of the contract." 22 ' A
contract should be treated as a whole and is integrated when by "consideration
of its terms, nature and purposes each and all of the parts appear to be
interdependent and common to one another." 222 If the contract is integrated then
individual, "interdependent" provisions cannot be separated.223
ARCO's arbitration agreement contained more than a single, isolated
unenforceable term. 22 4 The arbitration clause "was a highly integrated unit
containing three different illegal provisions" and established "a unified
procedure for handling all disputes, and its various unlawful provisions [were]
all a part of that overall procedure."2 25 ARCO had intended "to achieve through
arbitration what Congress has expressly forbidden" by using an arbitration
agreement to achieve an unlawful end.226 These provisions and ARCO's goal
served to "taint" the entire arbitration agreement. 2 27 Following this
determination, the court severed the entire arbitration agreement from the
container contract and sent the parties to litigation. The next section will discuss

216
217
218
219
220
221

222

Id. at 1247-48.
Id. at 1248.
Id. (citing Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 476 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting JOSEPH D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 478 & n.76 (3d ed.

1987)).
223
Id. (quoting Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435, 446 (9th Cir. 1957)).
224
Id. at 1248.
225
Id. at 1248-49.
226

Id. at 1249.

227

Id.
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the District of Columbia Circuit's suggestion that the above split does not exist
along clean circuit lines.
C.

The Districtof Columbia Circuit Theory

228
the District of Columbia
In Booker v. Robert Half International,
229
The court noted that the
Circuit suggested that there may be no circuit split.
differing results among the circuits "may well reflect not so much a split among
the circuits as variety among different arbitration agreements."2 30 Decisions
voiding arbitration agreements entirely often involved agreements without a
severability clause2 31 or agreements that were pervasively infected with
illegality.2 32 Decisions severing illegal provisions and compelling arbitration, on
the other hand, typically considered agreements that contained a severability
clause and discrete unenforceable provisions. 2 33 Both approaches to separability
and the District of Columbia Circuit's theory will be analyzed in the next Section.

IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL

fr

First, this Section will analyze the policies and rationales of each side of
the circuit split as well as the District of Columbia Circuit's claim that no split
exists when rendering a decision regarding an arbitration dispute in an arbitration
agreement. Then, this Section will present proposed solutions abolishing the
separability doctrine in its entirety and harmonizing the treatment of arbitration
agreements among the circuit courts.
A.

Analysis

The Circuits which follow the Severance approach and the Stand or Fall
Together approach justify their chosen position with a variety of policy
considerations. Each of these policies prioritizes a different element of contract
law. This Section will analyze the policies of both Severance and Stand or Fall
Together. The District of Columbia Circuit has suggested that there is no split
between the circuits. This Section will also analyze the District of Columbia
Circuit's claim. Finally, this section will propose that Congress abolish the
separability doctrine and amend the FAA to codify certain types of provisions as
void ab initio when placed into arbitration agreements. The first Section will
analyze the Severance approach.

228
229

230
231
232
233

413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Booker v. Robert Half Int'l., Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 84.
Id. (citing Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Id. (citing Graham Oil Co., 43 F.3d at 1247).
Id. (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003)).
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Analysis of the Severance Approach

The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits, which follow
the Severance approach,234 have stated two primary reasons for their policy:
preserving the intent of the parties and upholding federal policy favoring
arbitration.23 5 First, these circuits seek to "[give] effect to the intent of the
contracting parties." 23 6 When parties enter into an arbitration agreement, they
choose arbitration as their means of dispute resolution, and, therefore, their
wishes should be preserved. Unenforceable provisions can be severed from an
arbitration agreement without disturbing the parties' intent to arbitrate.237
Second, these circuits uphold the federal policy of favoring arbitration. By
adopting the FAA, Congress sought to enforce private arbitration agreements.2 38
Severance enforces arbitration agreements by removing only the unenforceable
provisions and enforcing the remainder of the arbitration agreement.
Contract interpretation principles require courts to follow the
unambiguous language of a contract to fulfill the parties' intentions. 23 9 Entering
into an arbitration agreement evinces the intention of the parties to resolve their
disputes through arbitration regardless of the enforceability of the other
provisions of the contract. Severance preserves the intention of the parties.
Severance functions to enforce arbitration agreements except in cases where
unenforceability cannot be rectified by severance. 2 4 0 Though severance
preserves both the intent of parties to arbitrate and the federal policy favoring
arbitration, it functions as judicial reformation.
When creating a contract and agreeing to its terms, the parties bind
themselves to the contract as a whole. Severing any terms effectively alters the
bargain. When parties agree to one set of terms and a court severs the
unenforceable terms and sends the dispute to arbitration, the parties are
arbitrating a new contract. A court cannot enforce unenforceable terms, so a court
can either void the entire agreement containing the unenforceable terms or sever
the unenforceable provisions. These circuits find severing unenforceable
provisions and effectively reforming the contract to be the better means of

234

Borstein, supra note 178, at 1259.

235

Id. at 1259-60.

236

Booker, 413 F.3d at 84 (citing Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Escambia Cty., 289 F.3d 723,

728-29 (11th Cir. 2002)).
237
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 2001).
238

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S.

468, 479 (1989).
239

11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 31:4

(4th ed. 2000).
240
See Campbell v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04059-NKL, 2016 WL 3248579, at *4
(W.D. Mo. June 13, 2016).
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upholding the federal policy favoring arbitration when compared to the Stand or
Fall Together approach.
The Severance approach effectively preserves the intent of the parties to
arbitrate but creates a new contract for both parties through judicial reformation.
While preserving the intent of the parties to arbitrate, it does not preserve the
unambiguous intent of the parties to enforce the agreed-upon contract as written.
2.

Analysis of the Stand or Fall Together Approach

The Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold arbitration
agreements containing unlawful provisions as entirely void. 241 These circuits
have three policy justifications for their approach. First, these circuits void entire
arbitration agreements because the presence of unlawful provisions taints an
arbitration agreement, rendering the agreement completely unenforceable. 2 42
Second, the severance of specific provisions functions as judicial reformation,
and courts are hostile to the reformation remedy.24 3 Third, there can be no assent
to an illegal contract. 2 4
The first policy justification for Stand or Fall Together is that Stand or
Fall Together deters a party from inserting unenforceable provisions into
arbitration agreements. Unenforceable provisions taint arbitration agreements
with illegality and render them completely void, and the threat of total voidance
of an arbitration agreement deters parties from using arbitration as a means of
circumventing the law. Unenforceable provisions will not be scrutinized absent
a complaint. By inserting unenforceable provisions, a party is gambling that these
provisions will be upheld in arbitration. The Stand or Fall Together approach
prevents this. If parties wish to arbitrate, they must do so in a legally enforceable
manner or not at all.
The second policy justification for Stand and Fall Together is that the
circuits following that approach resist judicial contract reformation by holding
that arbitration agreements are integrated agreements. The separability doctrine
holds that arbitration agreements are separate from their container contracts.
Were there no separability doctrine, unenforceable arbitration agreements would
void entire contracts in Stand or Fall Together circuits. Because there is a
separability doctrine, the container contract itself is one integrated agreement and
the arbitration agreement is separate integrated agreement. A court cannot void
an entire container contract without first addressing its arbitration agreement.
Therefore, unenforceable terms in the arbitration agreement do not taint and void
the container contract-only the arbitration agreement is voided.

241

BOrstein, supra note 178, at 1259.

242
243

Paladino v. Avnet Comput. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1058 (11th Cir. 1998).
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002).

244

WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 239, § 12:3.
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The third policy justification for Stand or Fall Together is that because
illegal contracts are unenforceable, an arbitration agreement with unenforceable
provisions is not a contract.2 45 A contract is an agreement, and an agreement is
a manifestation of mutual assent" of two or more persons.246 There can be no
mutual assent to illegality, and, therefore, there can be no contract.247
Both Stand or Fall Together and Severance prioritize different elements
of contract law, and neither is particularly preferable over the other.
Underpinning this split is the great variety amongst state laws. The District of
Columbia Circuit has suggested that the diversity of arbitration agreements has
merely created the appearance of a split. The next Section will analyze the
District of Columbia Circuit's contention.
3.

Analysis of the District of Columbia Circuit Theory

In its opinion in Booker, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
suggested that the different interpretations of arbitration agreements among the
circuits "may well reflect not so much a split among the circuits as variety among
different arbitration agreements." 24 8 The court suggested that the Stand or Fall
Together approach is applied when the arbitration agreement in question lacks a
severability clause249 or is "pervasively infected with illegality;"250 severance is
applied when an arbitration agreement includes a severability clause. 2 5 1 The
District of Columbia Circuit's assertion is not completely accurate though.
Mere variation in arbitration agreements cannot account for the policies
of entire circuits. When analyzing arbitration agreements, circuit courts must
apply state law because "in placing arbitration agreements on an even footing
with all other contracts, the FAA makes general state contract law
controlling." 2 52 The Supreme Court stated in Moses H. Cone that the
"enforcement of the [FAA] is left in large part to the state courts." 253 Booker,
though asserting that no split exists, actually demonstrates the issue which this

245
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 217 (3d Cir. 1992); Norfolk S. Bus
Corp. v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 159 F.2d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1947) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
CONTRACTS § 359 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932)).
246
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 3 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).

247
248
249
250

WILLISTON & LORD, supra note

239.
Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. (citing Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
Id. (citing Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1994)).

251

Id.
Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted);
see, e.g., Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024,1032 (11 th Cir. 2003) (enforcing
a severability clause on the grounds that "Alabama law favors severability, and it gives full force
and effect to severability clauses").
253
Szalai, supra note 72, at 119.
252
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Article is attempting to remedy. The next two Sections will analyze the Booker
court's assertion, demonstrating the negative impact that diverse state laws have
upon the FAA and the need of an FAA amendment.
i.

PervasivelyInfected with Illegality

The District of Columbia Circuit stated that Stand or Fall Together was
applied when an arbitration agreement is "pervasively infected with
illegality." 2 54 The determination that a contract is "pervasively infected with
illegality" is a judicial determination. No statutes define what "pervasively
infected with illegality" entails. In Graham Oil, the arbitration agreement was
"pervasively infected with illegality" due to the inclusion of three illegal
provisions, one of which sought to remove statutory protections given
specifically to petroleum companies. 255 The container contract and arbitration
agreement also lacked severability clauses. 25 6 The court provided no rule for
determining whether an arbitration agreement was permeated with illegality. Its
determination was based upon the facts of Graham Oil and those facts alone.
Other cases also fail to give a clear rule for determining whether an arbitration
agreement is pervasively infected with illegality.
For example, in the Fifth Circuit case Iberia CreditBureau v. Cingular
Wireless,2 5 7 most of the provisions of the arbitration agreement at issue contained
a severability clause and referred to both parties waiving certain rights, but "the
critical sentence" required cell phone customers to arbitrate disputes against
Cingular while allowing Cingular to litigate disputes against its customers.2 58
Iberia sued in Louisiana court, and the Fifth Circuit cited Louisiana cases which
had held that such a "disproportionate dispensation" of rights and remedies was
arbitrary and lacked good faith. 2 59 The Fifth Circuit found that severability,
regardless of the presence of a severability clause, would not remedy the
unenforceable provisions and, therefore, found the entire arbitration agreement
void. 260 In Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries,261 even though the
arbitration agreement included a severability clause, the clause was ignored due
to a lack of mutuality regarding the type of claims that must be arbitrated, the fee

254

Booker, 413 F.3d at 84.

255

Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994).

256

Id.

257

379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004).

258

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169 (quoting Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589,

259

596-97 (La. Ct. App. 2000), abrogatedby Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1 (2005)).
Following Aguillard, Louisiana law presumed arbitrability in adhesion contracts, but Sutton's Steel

still is a good example of a determination of illegality. Iberia, 379 F.3d at 176.
260

Iberia, 379 F.3d at 176.

261

298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

568

[Vol. 120

provision, and the discovery provision.262 The unenforceable provisions were
found to permeate Countrywide's arbitration agreement to the extent that
severability would not remedy them. 263 In Newton v. American Debt Services,264
an arbitration agreement including four non-essential, unconscionable provisions
was found to be permeated with illegality.26 5 In Net Global Marketing v.
Dialtone,2 66 the Fifth Circuit applied California law to determine that a unilateral
modification provision tainted an entire arbitration agreement with illegality that
could not be cured by severing the term.267 There is no standard to determine
whether an arbitration agreement is permeated with illegality or not. The
determination that an arbitration agreement is "permeated with illegality" is a
case-by-case determination.
Courts have formulated general rules to determine the extent of the
illegality, like a "multitude of unconscionable provisions in an agreement to
arbitrate will preclude severance and enforcement of arbitration" if the
agreement is one sided. 2 6 8 Though helpful, these general rules give no clear
definition of "permeated with illegality." Finding that an agreement is permeated
with illegality is a case by case determination. In circuits that often find
agreements to be permeated with illegality, precedent determines how a court
will rule. Circuits determine what "permeated with illegality" means in their own
circuit based on precedent. The aforementioned cases show this determination
does not turn on whether or not there is a severability clause in the contract. State
law is also a determining factor in applying separability.
Circuit courts apply state laws to separability determinations. For
example, Iberia and Net Global were decided on the laws of Louisiana and
California, respectively. Though it is true that some cases have turned on whether
an arbitration agreement was "permeated with illegality," it is more correct to
say that courts have found arbitration agreements "permeated with illegality" on
the basis of state law or based on prior cases in their circuit. Due to the variation
among state laws, there can be no uniform application of the separability
doctrine. Because separability is not applied uniformly, the FAA is not applied
uniformly across every jurisdiction even though the FAA intended to unify
arbitration law.

262

Id. at 788.

263

Id.

549 F. App'x. 692 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 694-95.
266
No. 04-56685, 2007 WL 57556 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2007).
267
Id. at *3 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002)).
268
Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Parilla v. IAP
Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 289 (3d Cir. 2004)).
264
265
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Effect of Severability Clauses

Contracts need not contain severability clauses for courts to sever
unenforceable provisions. Though some cases have turned on the presence of
severability clauses, courts have held that a severability clause is non-essential
to severing unenforceable provisions.2 69 At common law, courts may sever
unenforceable provisions without a severability clause.270 Even without a
severability clause, arbitration agreements that are unconscionable or those that
violate public policy may be enforced if the objectionable terms can be
severed. 27 ' Courts have voided entire arbitration agreements in the presence of
severability clauses, such as in Iberia.2 72 Courts have also severed individual
provisions in the absence of separability clauses, such as in Schreiber v. K-Sea
2 73
Courts do not differentiate between severability clauses in
Transportation.
container contracts and severability clauses in arbitration agreements when
severing provisions from arbitration agreements.2 74 Severability clauses are not
the only factor in determining whether a provision is severable or not.
As stated above, state statutes and state interpretation of the common law
of contracts are followed by the circuit courts. State law plays a huge role in
determining how separability is applied because circuit courts look to state law
for the law they apply. State laws regarding contract interpretation are not
universal. Buckeye required the states to apply separability but did nothing to
make the application of separability uniform.
When circuit courts apply separability, they are not applying a federal
common law doctrine. Rather, circuit courts are looking to the laws of the states
which fall within their circuit and the precedent the circuit has developed. This
leads to a lack of uniformity between circuits. The most direct solution to this
issue is to allow courts to circumvent separability completely by abolishing, it.
The next Section will propose amending the FAA to abolish separability as well

269
See Ragone v. Atl. Video, 595 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Schreiber v. K-Sea
Transp. Corp., 879 N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that unenforceable provisions may be

disregarded without triggering severability clause)); Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless

LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 171 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that adhesive nature of the arbitration agreement
could not be cured by the severability clause); Beletsis v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Corp., No. 01

CIV. 6266(RCC), 2002 WL 2031610, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (severing fees clause without mention
of severability clause in arbitration agreement).
270

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

271

See, e.g., Kepas v. eBay, 412 F. App'x 40, 49 (10th Cir. 2010).

272

Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 168.
Schreiberv. K-Sea Transp. Corp., 879 N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 2007); see also Collins & Aikman

273

Prod. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a court will sever those
claims subject to arbitration from those adjudicable only as a matter of policy).
274
Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that
because the contract contained an express severability provision applicable to all portions of the
contract, unenforceable terms of the arbitration agreement could be severed).
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as codifying specific types of provision as void ab initio when inserted into
arbitration agreements.
B.

Proposal

Professor Stephen Ware wants to abolish separability so that general
contract law may govern all contracts. He concedes that the "anti-separability"
rule he proposes has downsides. 2 75 Professor Ware's proposal does not resolve
every issue surrounding separability. Even with separability abolished, the
inconsistency of general state contract law as it applies to arbitration agreements
is not resolved. Though there is no single solution to resolving this inconsistency,
arbitration law can be made more consistent than it is now.
With the current state of separability, federal courts, by the general
nature of the judiciary, must apply divergent state laws. When creating an
amendment to the FAA which abolishes separability, as Professor Ware
proposes, it would also be helpful to unify the variations in state law regarding
arbitration for the sake of consistency. Without a separability doctrine, state
contract law would still differ, and the goal of the FAA was to improve the
consistency of arbitration law. An effective means of improving consistency
would be to implement a default mechanism that applies uniform law in specific
circumstances. Essentially, in addition to abolishing separability, the FAA
should adopt default rules.
The FAA already contains a default rule. For example, Section 5 of the
FAA allows a court to appoint an arbitrator when the arbitration agreement fails
to provide an arbitrator or a means to determine who the arbitrator will be.276
This provision functions as a default rule and ensures that a missing provision is
not fatal to an arbitration agreement, effectively preserving the intent of the
parties to arbitrate. New default rules should be codified to prevent certain types
of provisions from becoming a part of arbitration agreements.
The FAA needs to clearly codify what sorts of provisions are
unenforceable. This can be accomplished by codifying the holdings of the
various courts that have barred certain type of provisions. Such a statute could
read:
An arbitration agreement shall not:
waive statutory protections; 277
waive employment benefits upon the arbitration of a claim; 2 7 8

275

Ware, supra note 173, at 132.

276

9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
See Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
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designate a forum not within the domicile of either party; 27 9
allow for an appellate arbitration proceeding; 280
impose a statute of limitations to arbitrate claims; 2 81
or allow for unilateral amendments to the arbitration
agreement. 282

Any provision included in section (1) which is included in an
arbitration agreement is void ab initio.
No provision of an arbitration agreement is integral to any
contract. 283

Such a statute would further the goals of the FAA. It could be argued
that such a statute would run in contravention to the current broad application of
the FAA. It would not. Litigation abounds regarding the enforceability of the
provisions of arbitration agreements. Section two of the FAA allows for all
contract defenses to be asserted against an arbitration agreement, so an
amendment which automatically bars certain types of provisions merely applies
a sort of uniform contract defense by default. By defining what exactly is
permissible in an arbitration agreement, arbitration agreements are eisily
analyzed by courts, and contracting parties will know exactly what an arbitration
agreement may contain. Further, because the bar on these specific provisions is
statutory, courts will not be at risk of reforming the contract. Specific illegal
provisions should be codified by the FAA, rendering such provisions void ab
initio. Not only would this settle expectations, but this would also mend the
circuit split by endorsing the policies of both the Stand or Fall Together and
Severance circuits.
The FAA would endorse the policies of both Stand or Fall Together and
Severance approaches by rendering certain types of unenforceable provisions
void ab intio. Stand or Fall Together seeks to bar any unenforceable provisions

279
See Britvan v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., No. 2:16-cv-04075-ODW (JPRx), 2016 WL
3896821, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
16 (1972) ("(1) if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or
overreaching; 2) if the party wishing to repudiate the clause would effectively be deprived of his
day in court were the clause enforced; and 3) if enforcement would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which suit is brought")).
280
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 985 (Cal. 2003).
281
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).
282
Salazar v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 90 P.3d 466, 470 (N.M. 2004).
283
"Thus, before deciding whether a contract provision is severable, a court must determine
whether that provision is integral to the contract. And the severance of an essential contract term
'is not allowed,' even where the contract contains a severance clause." Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta,
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680, 688 (2013) (emphasis omitted) (citing AMB Property, L.P. v. MTS, Inc.,
551 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Nolley v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co., 476 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996)). It is only necessary to ensure that arbitration agreements are never integral to a
contract to ensure that no court allows the argument to be made that certain unenforceable
provisions are not void due to integration.
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from being inserted into an arbitration agreement. The theory that illegal
provisions taint an entire agreement 2 84 is a deterrent to inserting unenforceable
provisions into arbitration agreements, but if these provisions are void ab initio
such terms can never be inserted. They would never be part of the contract, and
this would be an absolute deterrent. Because these provisions are void ab initio,
they are statutorily red lined, and inserting them into an arbitration agreement
would be useless. The policies behind Stand or Fall Together would be codified.
Also, the Severance approach could also be codified.
The Severance approach seeks to preserve the parties' intent to arbitrate.
Under this proposal, the intent to arbitrate will be preserved unless a court
applying general contract law finds the arbitration agreement unenforceable. The
validity of arbitration agreements would be much easier to determine because
there would be no need for severance. With certain types of provisions
automatically unenforceable in arbitration agreements, parties who have
previously sought to use arbitration as an extra-judicial tool to leverage an
advantage against a complaining party will lose that advantage. Arbitration
would be only a tool to expedite dispute resolution without a significant burden
on resources, just as Congress intended. With separability abolished, parties
would enter into arbitration agreements because they actually intended to
arbitrate their dispute. The policies of the Severance Circuit would be codified.
The policies of both Severance and Stand or Fall Together would be codified.
Though the separability doctrine would be no more, arbitration under this
proposal would still function in largely the same way as it does under
separability.
If a party were to challenge a contract with an arbitration agreement
under a system which has abolished separability and codified specific
unenforceable provisions, the process would not appear entirely dissimilar to the
current system. A court would first examine all challenged provisions, including
the arbitration agreement, under general contract law. At this stage, a court using
general contract law could find the entire arbitration agreement, the entire
contract, or any provisions thereof unenforceable. If a court is satisfied that the
contract and the arbitration agreement are valid and enforceable, the court would
then sever any statutorily void provisions in the arbitration agreement. The FAA
requires arbitration agreements to be enforced unless the agreement to arbitrate
is unenforceable. Unless the arbitration agreement was found unenforceable, the
dispute will be sent to arbitration. Arbitration would be uniformly applied in all
jurisdictions. After red lining the unenforceable provisions, an arbitration
agreement could be a mere shell of its former self, simply an agreement to settle
disputes through arbitration, but the gap fillers in the FAA would fill these gaps,
and the dispute would move to arbitration. This proposal would not only unify
the application of severability, but it would also expedite contract complaints.

284

Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Abolishing separability and codifying which sorts of provisions are
unenforceable would allow a court to address all contract issues simultaneously.
This proposal is efficient and allows courts to come to a conclusion after a much
more thorough examination of the entire contract. As the Arkansas Supreme
Court has noted, not all answers to questions regarding an arbitration agreement
are found in the agreement itself. 285 When a party claims a contract is
unenforceable, the entire contract could be examined, and a determination could
be reached regarding its various provisions. Both parties would have the
protections of general contract law, and the process of arbitration would be
further expedited by dispensing with legal determinations that an arbitrator
would be otherwise required to make. Further, it allows the court's determination
to be appealed, adding an extra layer of protection for both parties not provided
by arbitration. Arbitration agreements brought before courts would be treated
uniformly, regardless of where the contract was formed and regardless of any
other provision in the contract. Though this proposal would unify how courts
treat arbitration agreements, it would not unify all state contract law.
All state law is not uniform, but the goal of the FAA is not to settle
expectations for all laws in all jurisdictions. The law regarding arbitration
agreements will be settled, allowing for the laws of any jurisdiction to govern
arbitration agreements in a consistent way. This distinction is subtle but
important. For instance, the FAA is not concerned with uniform remedies for
contracts claims in all states. The FAA is concerned with ensuring that arbitration
agreements are used the same way in Kansas as they are in Kentucky. Certain
provisions will never be allowed in arbitration agreements in any jurisdiction.
How courts handle the remainder of the contract is left up to state laws, and state
laws will always vary based on the needs or preferences of that jurisdiction. Still,
arbitration agreements would be treated uniformly. Amending the FAA to
abolish separability and codified specific types of provisions as void ab ignitio
will make the enforcement of arbitration agreements consistent in all states and
meet the goals of the FAA.
V. CONCLUSION

The FAA should be amended to abolish separability and codify
unenforceable provisions to render them void ab initio. In doing so, courts will
be able to address every contract defense, allowing parties to the contract to use
all contract defenses. Parties could avail themselves of all contract defenses and,
by statutorily severing the unenforceable provisions of the arbitration agreement,
the intent of the parties to arbitrate would be preserved. The best solution to the
quagmire that is separability is to abolish it by statute and codify which sorts of
provisions are permitted in arbitration agreements.
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Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 434 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ark. 2014).
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